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T HE ISSUE OF THE right of recovery by a building contractor
who has failed to comply literally with the specifications of
building codes and ordinances has provoked much discussion and
has brought forth opinions from Courts and text writers, many of
which are diametrically opposed.
The authorities are generally agreed that a contract, whether
it be a building contract or not, which upon execution will, by the
thing which it tends to create, breach a positive law, is void and
unenforceable.' But, as is true of other rules of law which can
not and do not have universal application, the courts will grant
exceptions if justice will be better served by so doing. A court
may, upon hearing the facts of a case, deviate from the general
rule and grant relief to a party to an agreement calling for con-
struction violative of a building code. Enforcement is effected not
designedly to favor the building contractor but rather not to deny
protection to the party who was more culpable in attempting to
carry out the illegal purpose. And so where a contractor expends
his labor in erecting or constructing contrary to building code
specifications or any other municipal ordinance,2 or if he fails to
secure a required permit from the municipality permitting him to
perform the work,3 or fails to submit plans which are required
before the work is started,4 or for any other violation of the
* Messrs. Rubenstein and Murray are third year students at Cleveland-
Marshall.
1 Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387 (1853). The general proposition that a
contract made in violation of a statutory prohibition, is void, is not con-
troverted. The infliction of a penalty for the commission of an act is
equivalent to an express prohibition of such acts. This principle seems to be
settled and accepted by the great weight of authority.
2 Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474 (1872).
3 Fox v. Rogers, 171 Mass. 546, 50 N. E. 1041 (1898). A lawful contract to
lay a drain, although carried out in an illegal manner because no permit
was obtained and the work was not done by a registered plumber as re-
quired by law, cannot be declared illegal as a whole so as to prevent re-
covery under it.
4 Ordway v. Newburyport, 230 Mass. 306, 119 N. E. 863 (1918); Palefsky v.
Connor, 270 Mass. 410, 170 N. E. 410 (1930).
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codified law,5 he must present his case to the court and let the
facts speak for themselves.
The courts are in disagreement as to when a liberal inter-
pretation of the strict general rule should be applied, and in the
following paragraphs there have been set forth the opinions that
have been promulgated by the courts in various jurisdictions in
their attempt to promote justice and grant relief to those who are
deserving of it. In considering the nature of the law which has
been positively and expressly codified and its effect in invalidat-
ing an agreement which, by its provisions, violates the law, the
authorities have found that building ordinances as well as stat-
utes should be given practical application and interpreted in the
light of the conditions and circumstances under which they are
passed and the objects sought to be attained.
Legislative Intent.
The courts have, primarily, entertained two views in regard
to the purpose of the building code or ordinance. One of these
views, in effect, is that legislation which lays down rules and
regulations serving mainly to regulate the trade or business which
is covered by it, and to impose a penalty for its violation will not
make the contract relating thereto illegal or unenforceable.6
However, the second view, and the one more generally applied,
namely, ex turpi causa non oritur actio-that no cause of action
lies for an illegal act-is usually followed in the absence of facts
which would compel a different ruling.
7
The courts will always look to the language of the statute,
the intent of the legislature at the time of its enactment,8 the sub-
5 Wolpa et al. v. Hambly, 20 Ohio App. 236, 153 N. E. 135 (1923); Gagnon v.
Ainsworth, 283 Mass. 488, 186 N. E. 498 (1933).
6 Adams Express Co. v. Darden (C. C. A., Tenn.), 286 F. 61, aff'd., 265 U. S.
265, 44 S. Ct. 502, 68 L. Ed. 1010 (1924). "When a statute imposes specific
penalties for its violation where the act is not malum in se, and the purpose
of the statute can be accomplished without declaring contracts in violation
thereof illegal, the inference is that it was not the legislative intent to render
such contract illegal and unenforceable." See also Warren People's Market
Co. v. Corbett & Sons, 114 Ohio St. 126, 151 N. E. 51 (1926); Restatement of
Law of Contracts, Sect. 580.
7 Miller v. Ammon, 145 U. S. 421, 12 S. Ct. 884 (1892). An ordinance of the
city of Chicago providing for a penalty for anyone who shall sell or offer to
sell liquors in quantities of one gallon or more without first obtaining a per-
mit is held valid and contract made in violation of it creates no right of
action which a court of justice will enforce. The general rule of law is that
a contract made in violation of a statute is void.
8 Fischer-Liemann Const. Co. v. Haase et al., 64 Ohio App. 473, 29 N. E. 2d 46
(1940).
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ject matter, and the wrongful act which it seeks to prevent as
tests of whether a violative contract is legal or illegal.9 In this
respect there is no difference between statutes and ordinances.
The legislation must be judged as a whole, regard being had
not only for its language but for the objects and purposes for
which it was enacted. The imposition of a penalty by a building
code does not necessarily imply a legislative intent that the act
penalized is void and is of no legal effect,"' however when a penal
statute is silent, and contains nothing from which the contrary
can be properly inferred, a contract in contravention of it is void.11
In respect to interpretation, whatever the structure of the statute,
whether prohibiting an act and imposing a penalty, or merely
imposing a penalty, it is not to be taken for granted that the
legislature meant to preclude a building contractor from en-
forcing that proscribed agreement in a court of justice.
The two leading cases in Ohio, the Fischer-Liemann Case 12
and the Spurgeon Case13 are illustrative of the interpretation
given to two types of building ordinances. In the Fischer-Liemann
Case the ordinance in question provided regulation in respect to
the installation of brick veneer on buildings. The contractor's
method of installing the brick veneer was improper, but notwith-
standing the violation, upon suit brought by him upon the con-
tract, the court found in his favor. The ordinance was deemed
one of a regulatory nature and not prohibitive. And since the act
of installing the veneer itself was not unlawful but merely im-
properly executed it could not be prudently reasoned that the
legislature meant to invalidate that type of agreement.
However, the courts reached a different finding in the Spur-
geon Case. Here a builder, in contravention of a zoning ordinance,
constructed a bowling alley in a tavern which was located near a
residential area, and brought suit to recover on the contract. The
court construed the zoning ordinance as a law that seeks to pre-
9 Mann v. Mann, 176 N. C. 353, 97 S. E. 175 (1917).
10 Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa 546 (1873). ". . . in every instance courts
will look to the language and subject matter of the statute, the wrong and
evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be
accomplished by the enactment, and if from all of this it is manifest that it
was not intended to render the particular acts void, the courts will so hold
and construe the statute accordingly."
11 Miller v. Ammon, supra Note 7.
12 Fischer-Liemann Const. Co. v. Haase et al., 64 Ohio App. 473, 29 N. E.
2nd 46 (1940).
13 Spurgeon v. McElwain, 6 Ohio 442, 27 Am. Dec. 266 (1834).
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vent the act performed and reasoned that a contract calling for
such an unlawful act must be invalid and unenforceable.14
Parties in Pari Delicto.
Another important factor to be considered in determining the
rights of parties to avoid building contracts such as those under
consideration would be the role they each would play in bringing
about the ultimate violation. Whether the parties are in pari
delicto would depend upon their relative innocence or degree of
knowledge of the unlawful character of their acts. The courts
have shown a strong tendency toward applying, even in border
line cases, the strict rule that parties equally guilty in per-
petrating an unlawful act will be left in the same position in
which they placed themselves and the court will not lend its aid in
enforcing the "illegal contract."15 But where a statute imposes a
penalty upon one of them and not upon the other, the parties to
the transaction are not to be regarded as in pari delicto. And so
where one party is the principal offender and the other party only
indirectly connected with the unlawful act there is no parity of
delictum and the one protected by the law or fraudulently de-
ceived or acting under compulsion, may resort to the law and
recover money paid, or for services rendered. 16 The opportunity
to solicit the aid of the court in enforcing the contract is also
available to an innocent party to the contract for whose protec-
tion the statute was enacted.
There have been cases in which the distinction has been made
between violative contracts when both parties are equally cul-
pable, and those in which, although both parties participated in
the unlawful act, the guilt rests chiefly with one. In these cases
the maxim, ex dolo malo non oritur actio, is qualified by another,
that is, in pari delicto melior est conditio defendentis. Unless,
14 A case which contained facts similar to those presented in both of the
above cases is that of Eastern Expanded Metal Co. v. Webb Granite and
Construction Co., 195 Mass. 356, 81 N. E. 251 (1907). The Building Code of the
City of Boston forbade the erection of a building with a roof pitch of over
20 degrees. The court interpreted this ordinance to be one that the legisla-
ture must have meant to prohibit this unlawful act and so the suit brought
by the contractor failed.
15 It is recognized that the phrase "illegal and void contract" is a contra-
diction in terms; however whether an agreement once regarded as a "con-
tract" by the parties to it is void or not, is frequently a legal conclusion to be
drawn only after extensive litigation. The phrase is therefore used in this
article with expectation of the reader's indulgence.
16 Thomas v. Owens, 206 Okla. 50, 241 P. 2d 1114 (1952).
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therefore, the parties are in pari delicto as well as in particips
criminis, the courts, although the contract will be illegal, will
afford relief where equity requires it, to the more innocent party.
The courts have found it necessary and essential, in such con-
tracts, to justify the granting of relief, that the contract be merely
malum prohibitum.17 If malum in se the court will in no case
interfere to relieve either party from its consequences. But where
a contract neither involves moral turpitude nor violates any
principle of public policy the party not in pari delicto will be
awarded relief. In Browning v. Morse, Lord Mansfield' 8 reiterated
the argument of Blackstone to the effect that, ". . . it is very
natural that the statute itself, by the distinction it makes, has
marked the criminal, for the penalties are all on one side-upon
the office keeper."
Guilty knowledge of the illegal purpose of the work to be per-
formed by the building contractor has for the most part precluded
recovery for his work,19 but because of the diversity of fact situ-
ations, certainly some of them warranting the questioning atten-
tion of the courts, the contractor has been allowed recovery. 20
A strict view of the rule construing a contractor to be in pari
delicto in possessing guilty knowledge of the future unlawful use
of the thing he would erect was expressed by Judge Lane in the
"bowling alley" case.2 1 He stated that, ". .. if the ordinary use of
the thing produced be illegal, he must be taken to have intended
the use . . ." It would seem that this view was prudently applied
considering the facts surrounding the case, particularly that the
bowling alley was "mala sui generis," or inherently bad, and
never could be used lawfully in that residential area. Counsel
for plaintiff, however, presented an intelligent and feasible argu-
ment in averring that mere knowledge of the unlawful use of the
premises for a bowling alley should not preclude recovery by the
contractor; because if the courts were to use this means of
evaluating the effect of guilty knowledge they would indirectly
inflict penalties upon the comparatively innocent vastly more
severe than the statute warrants against the principal offenders.
He argued further that to prevent a recovery, it is necessary that
17 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 618 (1908) and cases therein cited.
18 Browning v. Morris, 2 Cowp. 790; 12 Am. Jur. 652, Sec. 158.
19 Spurgeon v. McElwain, note 13 supra.
20 Thomas v. Owens, note 16 supra.
21 Spurgeon v. McElwain, note 13 supra.
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it should appear that plaintiff (contractor) would share the profits
of the illegal operation.
A similar case, but one in which the court came to a different
conclusion was that of Bishop v. Honey.22 This case involved a
suit brought by a building contractor for labor and materials
used in erecting a building that he knew was to be used for a
house of prostitution. The court found for the plaintiff and in its
opinion stated, "Mere knowledge, by the vendor of goods, of the
illegal purpose for which they are to be used is no defense to an
action to recover the price." The court felt that if the plaintiff
were in any way to gain by, or be the partner in, the illegal
undertaking he could not recover, but in the case at bar the
house was not paid for out of the proceeds of the vocation prac-
tised within it, but it was to be paid for as the work progressed
upon it.
This conclusion was also found applicable in Michael v.
Bacon 23 where the contractor performed work on a house that he
knew was to be used as a gambling establishment. The court
ruled that the contractor's knowledge of the purpose did not af-
fect the contract.
Contracts, Executed or Executory.
May the parties to an illegal agreement change their minds
and be protected by the courts, or must they remain in the posi-
tion they find themselves? The answers lie in well established
principles of law applicable to illegality in general.
It has been generally held that where the contract's illegal
purpose has not been effected and the builder becomes aware of
the illegal nature of the work to be done and makes a timely
repudiation of the contract, he may reclaim the value of the labor
performed and the value of the materials furnished, and the
owner can neither recover damages in the event he chooses to
bring a cross petition, nor defeat the contractor's claim by al-
leging that the builder has breached his contract. It has been
held in many cases that where the matters called for in a contract
are illegal in a sense that they are mala prohibita and while the
contract still remains executory, either party may disaffirm it
on the grounds of illegality and recover back money and property
22 34 Tex. 245 (1870).
23 49 Mo. 474 (1872).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol2/iss2/5
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
that has been advanced under it and so long as it remains entirely
unexecuted in that part which violates the law, there is "locus
penitentiae." The disaffirming party has the same right to have
compensation for the benefit conferred upon the real estate that
he would have to recover for money or property received by the
other party before the disaffirmance of such an agreement.
But, where the illegal purpose has been accomplished and the
contract partially executed by both parties,-as where one has
paid out money on the contract and the other has rendered serv-
ices, or otherwise suffered damages by part performance on his
part,-then the condition of the parties is the same as if the con-
tract has been fully executed, and the courts shy away from
aiding either of the parties in its further execution, or in undoing
what has been done under it. And so if a builder were to enter
into a contract to erect a structure not in conformity with ex-
pressed building laws, and performing some of it which the law
has deemed unlawful, he could not be restored to status quo, be-
cause to support his cause he would have to depend on an un-
lawful act to enforce his claim.
Almost unanimously the courts have applied the strict rule
as to illegal contracts when the contracts have been fully exe-
cuted and that is that parties to an unlawful contract can never
deserve, nor be granted relief, if the contract is wholly executed.
In refusing to award relief to a party to an illegal contract, the
court does not look beyond the point at which the unlawful act
was consummated. 2
4
And so where a builder has not yet performed the illegal
work he may make a timely rescission and recover quantum
meruit; if the agreement is executed the court will not rescind it,
nor grant relief either to the builder for his services nor to the
owner to enforce the contract.
Permit Requirements of a Model Building Code.
At this point it is timely to show some of the ramifications of
a model building code and the requirements prescribed in that
code. This is the code that the courts must construe when de-
ciding whether the prohibitions are of such a nature as to hold
all contracts embodying them unenforceable.
24 13 C. J. 496, n. 21, and cases therein cited.
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When will a building permit be required? The various
municipalities in attempting to promote the safety and welfare of
their citizens, have promulgated rules and regulations pertaining
to the requirements for obtaining building permits within their
jurisdiction. An exemplification of these provisions contained in
the "City of Cleveland Building Code" provide that, ". . . no
person, firm, or corporation shall erect, construct, enlarge, alter,
repair, move, or demolish a building or other structure, or install
any equipment or other appurtenances the installation of which
is regulated by this Code, or cause the same to be done, without
first making application to the Commissioner of Building and
Housing and obtaining a permit therefor unless this Code specifi-
cally provides that such work may be done without a permit. ' ' 25
The exceptions to the above requirements of building code
provide that, "Ordinary minor repairs may be made without filing
an application or obtaining a permit, provided that permits for
such repairs are not specifically required by this Code, and pro-
vided further that such repairs are made without violating any
provisions of this Code." 26
If the work that is to be done meets the situation set down
in the Building Code then "An application for a permit will be
required and signed by the owner or his authorized agent, shall
be filed with the Commissioner of Building and Housing on a
form furnished by him and shall provide such information as may
reasonably be required by the Commissioner for an intelligent
understanding of the proposed work." 27
Failure to Obtain a Permit and Its Contractual Effect.
Will a contract be enforced which either directly or indirectly
violates a provision of the Building Code? The precise violation
to be presently considered is the failure to obtain a building
permit as required by the Code. The influence of this failure can
only be shown by wide search in many jurisdictions.
From an affirmative point of view one court found that "An
examination of the sections of the ordinance before us shows:
(1) The making of repairs and improvements is not unlawful
25 Building Code, City of Cleveland, Chap. 979, Div. C, Sec. 979-7, Subsec.
(a).
26 Id., Subsec. (d).
27 Building Code, City of Cleveland, Chap. 979, Div. C, Sec. 979-8, Subsec.
(a), Clause 1.
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per se. It is only when they are done without a permit that the
ordinance is violated. (2) Contracts made for the making of re-
pairs and improvements without securing a permit are not de-
clared to be void or unenforceable. (3) If a permit is not obtained
for the making of repairs and improvements then the offending
person, or persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and
punished by fine." 28 The final view expressed by the same court
was "Although the necessary permit to make repairs and improve-
ments on building had not been obtained from the city by the
owner when contract for repair and improvement of building
was executed, and no such permit had been obtained by owner at
time he repudiated the contract, the contract was enforceable and
owner was liable in damages for breach thereof." 29
In a Pennsylvania case relating to mechanic's liens the court
enforced the contract and held that, "Granting appellant did
violate the city ordinance by proceeding with alterations or re-
pair work for which the mechanic's lien was filed, without a
permit, that did not invalidate the mechanic's lien... Violation of
the ordinance may have subjected the appellant to specific penal-
ties set forth therein, but these penalties for non-compliance are
limited to those expressly provided in the ordinance. No other
remedy is enforceable." 30
Another building contract was enforced when the court de-
cided that "to lay.a drain was not illegal even if a required permit
had not been obtained, the parties not intending to contract for
anything illegal." 31
The foregoing conclusions regarding the lack of a building
permit in connection with a building contract and its effect on
the enforceability of the contract do not conclusively show that
in other fact situations the building contract may be held to be
unenforceable nonetheless. For example, building contracts per-
formed which violated the Building Code have been held unen-
forceable due to the violation of the Code itself. It is said in one
case that, "Where an ordinance requires that a permit for build-
ing must be obtained, an agreement between the builder and
28 Comeaux v. Mann, 244 S. W. 2d (Tex.) 274 (1951).
29 Id., 2nd par. of syllabus.
30 Kessler v. Mandel, 156 Pa. Super. 505, 40 A. 2d 926 (1945); Beckershoff
et ux v. Bomba, 112 Pa. Super. 294, 170 A. 449 (1934).
31 Fox v. Rogers, 171 Mass. 546, 50 N. E. 1041 (1898).
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owner to construct without obtaining such permit is unlawful
and cannot form the basis of a civil action." 32
Also, the absence of a permit may be used as the basis for
illegality if it is first decided that the permit is part of the con-
sideration. In order for the contract to be illegal the object must
be illegal. "To invalidate the contract, the illegality must be in-
herent and not merely collateral. The contract is to be judged by
its character and not by what the parties may do or attempt to
do, with the fruits of it, and the courts will look to the substance
and not the mere form of the transaction. If the contract itself
discloses no illegality and may be performed in a legal manner,
it is not rendered unenforceable by the fact that it may also be,
or is actually, performed in an illegal manner." 33
Is the Work in Itself Illegal?
The most important question to be kept in mind in a building
contract is the legal or illegal classification of the work itself.
Observing the problem with this question in mind, requires a
recognition of the distinction between the terms malum in se and
malum prohibitum. These terms have great effect upon the en-
forcement of questionable contracts, depending on the contract's
object.
"Acts mala in se are felonies or breaches of public duties, in-
juries to person or property, outrages upon public decency or
good morals, and breaches of official duty, when done willfully or
corruptly. Acts mala prohibita are acts forbidden by statute, but
not otherwise wrong." 34 "A misdemeanor of the second class,
penal by statute, is mala prohibita." 35
The model Building Code clearly states that "within the scope
of this code as herein defined, the purpose of this code is to pro-
vide minimum standards to safeguard life or limb, health, prop-
erty and public welfare." 36 It goes on to state that "all buildings
or structures which are structurally unsafe, unsanitary, or not
provided with adequate safe egress, or which constitute a fire
hazard, or are otherwise dangerous to human life, or which in
82 Smith v. Lunning Co., 111 Cal. 308, 43 P. 967 (1896).
33 C. J. S. Contracts, Sec. 190.
34 Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 19 Am. Rep. 362 (1873).
35 People v. Mahon, 1 Idaho, 330 (1870).
36 Building Code, City of Cleveland, Chap. 979, Div. B, Sec. 979-1.
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relation to existing use constitute a hazard to safety or health by
reason of inadequate maintenance, obsolescence, or abandonment
are, severally for the purpose of this Title, declared to be illegal
and shall be abated by repair and rehabilitation or by demolition.
" 37
Although the purpose of the Building Code has undoubtedly
been inspired from a moral point of view as can readily be seen
from the preceding paragraph it does not necessarily mean that
all violations of the Code will be looked upon as malum in se.
Regardless of whether the act is malum in se or malum pro-
hibitum, a general rule of law holds "any bargain is illegal if
either the formation or the performance thereof is prohibited by
constitution or statute." 38 For instance "A, the owner of land
enters into a contract with B, a builder, to construct a building
that materially violates the building laws. The bargain is il-
legal." 39
It is said further that, "All contracts which are in violation
of law are illegal, and no action or suit will lie to enforce
them. And it is immaterial whether the contract is directly
prohibited, or arises collaterally out of transactions prohibited
by statute. Nor is it material whether there is in fact any corrupt
intentions on the part of either of the contracting parties to
violate the law .... There can be no civil right where there can
be no legal remedy for that which is in itself illegal. And this is
true as well of contracts malum in se as of contracts malum pro-
hibitum .... ,, 40
Further, it is said that "A contract in violation of the pro-
hibition of a statute is unlawful and void, and will not be en-
forced. It has been said that the legislature can and does define
the public policy of the state. . . . The law is supreme and no
contract between individuals can make it lawful to do that which
the statute positively commands shall not be done. A party, who
enters into a contract despite a statute prohibiting it, cannot there-
after claim the fruits of its performance in a court of justice." 41
37 Building Code, City of Cleveland, Chap. 979, Div. E, Sec. 979-29, Sub-
sec. (a).
38 Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 580, Subsec. 1 (1932).
39 Id., Subsec. 2a, Illus. 2 (1932).
40 Price v. Marcus, 199 Okl. 356, 185 P. 2d 953 (1947).
41 9 Ohio Jur. 341, Contracts, Sec. 124, and cases cited.
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Acts Classified as Malum in se.
The issuance of a building permit is mainly to protect the
welfare of the public as stated in the purpose clauses of the Build-
ing Code, and therefore any violation of the Code, as construed
by some courts, is an act which is malum in se. This fact was
readily brought out in an Ohio case42 "when the building com-
missioner refused to grant the permit applied for, upon the
ground that the provisions of the ordinance of the city comprising
its building code prohibits the conversion of the fifth story of
relator's building into residence apartments and forbids the use
of that portion of the building for tenement purposes." The court
went on to state that "The authority of a municipality in the exer-
cise of its police power to enact and enforce ordinances of this
nature, which provide for and secure the safety and welfare
of the people, is no longer open to question. Such regulations are
in no wise an invasion of property rights, for no one has a right to
use his property in a manner that unreasonably and unnecessarily
endangers the lives of others; hence in the interest of the public
welfare a property owner must submit to a reasonable regula-
tion and limitation of the use of his property."
In instances where contracts will not be enforced due to
illegality the maxims ex turpi causa non oritur actio and ex dolo
malo non oritur actio (causes of action based on an illegal or
immoral act), gave rise to the opinion stated by Lord Mansfield
that, "no court will lend its aid to a man who founds his action
upon an immoral or an illegal act. It is upon that ground that
the court goes, not for the sake of the defendant but because
they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff." 44
For example, in an action by a plaintiff to foreclose a me-
chanic's lien on a contract to perform a service which did not
comply with the price regulations set up by the 0. P. A. it was
held "both under Federal and State authorities, that where parties
who are charged with the knowledge of the law... undertake to
enter a contract in violation thereof they will be left in the po-
sition which they put themselves." 45 An Illinois case held that,
"... under the city building code making it unlawful to alter
42 State ex rel. The Euclid-Doan Building Co. v. Cunningham, 97 Ohio St.
130, 119 N. E. 361 (1918).
44 Holman v. Johnson, Cocop. 341.
45 Perma-Stone Corporation v. Merkel et ux, 255 Wis. 565, 39 N. W. 2d 730
(1949).
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building without permit and providing a penalty for each offense,
failure to obtain permit made building contract unenforceable,
and the fine provided was an additional penalty for failure to
comply." 46
When the thing to be performed is in itself of an illegal nature
and against the morals of the community justice will not lend its
aid to the enforcement of the contract. "A summary of an old
Ohio case has held that a contract, whose object is tainted with
illegality, will not be enforced. A nine-pin alley in conjunct-ion
with the operation of a tavern, and any contract in violation
thereof must of necessity be illegal and void as being against
public morals and in derogation of the statute. If the ordinary
use of the thing produced be illegal, he must be taken as intending
the 'use, and as a privy to the illegality, and therefore entitled
to no benefit for his labor." 47
Acts Classified as Malum Prohibitum.
"If the contract as made could have been performed in a legal
manner, the courts will not declare it void and unenforceable be-
cause it may have been performed in an unlawful manner." 48
Summarizing an Ohio case where the installation of brick
veneer on a building was to be done in a manner violative of a
building code, the improper method of installation was no defense
to a suit on the contract and the contract was held not to be il-
legal or void. The court held that when a person enters into a
contract to have brick veneer placed upon his residence in an im-
proper manner, so that the completed work is not satisfactory
and violates the building code provisions, he cannot set up such
improper method of applying the brick veneer as a defense to an
action for labor, work and materials furnished in accordance with
the contract. The court stated that a contract to brick veneer
a building contrary to the provisions of a city building code is not
illegal, void and unenforceable when the contract has been sub-
stantially performed by one party and there is no ordinance mak-
ing such a contract itself unlawful.49
46 Litwin v. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank et al., 347 IM. App. 75, 105 N. E.
2d 807 (1952).
47 Spurgeon v. McElwain, 6 Ohio Reports 442 (1834).
48 Comeaux v. Mann, 244 S. W. 2d (Tex.) 274 (1951).
49 Fischer-Liemann Construction Co., v. Haase et al., 64 Ohio App. Rep. 473,
29 N. E. 2d 46 (1940).
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When Will an Illegal Contract be Held Valid.
"Contracts made in violation of statutes, if not malum in se,
are sometimes held valid, and generally so notwithstanding the
infraction of law, whenever it becomes necessary to save from
injury persons for whose protection the violated statutes were
enacted, or whenever the public interests require that such con-
tracts be enforced." 50
"When a statute imposes specific penalties for its violation,
where the act is not malum in se, and the purpose of the statute
can be accomplished without declaring contracts in violation
thereof illegal, the inference is that it was not the legislative intent
to render such contracts illegal and unenforceable, and the court
must examine the entire statute to discover whether the Legisla-
ture intended to prevent courts from enforcing contracts based
on the act prohibited, and unless it does so appear, only the penal-
ties imposed by the statute can be enforced." 51
Conclusion.
"A distinction is made between acts which are mala in se,
which are generally regarded as absolutely void, in the sense that
no right or claim can be derived from them; and acts which are
mala prohibita, which are void or voidable, according to the
nature and effect of the act prohibited." 52
In conclusion it can safely be stated that contracts in viola-
tion of the Building Code which are malum in se will not be en-
forced in most instances and contracts in violation of the Building
Code, which are malum prohibitum, will ordinarily be enforced.
50 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 618 (1908).
51 In re T. H. Bunche Co., 180 Fed. 519 (1910).
52 Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 150 (1883).
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